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Contesting International Norms of Transitional Justice: 
The Case of Timor Leste
Eva Ottendörfer, Peace Research Institute, Frankfurt am Main, Germany
A discussion of the interplay of different concepts of justice and reconciliation in United Nations peace operations in Timor Leste and in the Timorese political 
leadership. Drawing on research into norm diffusion and concepts of localization and norm contestation to understand how societies deal with their violent 
past under the auspices of international actors in UN peace operations, the analysis challenges the UN’s functionalistic concept of transitional justice as a pre-
condition to state- and nationbuilding in post-conflict societies. As the case of Timor Leste demonstrates, the Timorese leadership has been successful in pro-
moting its own concept of justice and reconciliation, leading to a localized version of state- and nationbuilding that openly contests international approaches.
After the rather sobering experiments with the inter-
national ad-hoc tribunals in Rwanda and the former Yugo-
slavia in the mid-1990s, the United Nations developed a 
complementary approach to transitional justice consisting 
of tribunals and truth commissions established within the 
respective country. This new approach was assumed to 
better meet the aim of peace operations by having an im-
pact on peace- and statebuilding. However, as this article 
will demonstrate for Timor Leste, the complementary ap-
proach did not have the expected impact. Instead, political 
leaders have successfully sidelined internationally induced 
transitional justice initiatives and promoted their own con-
cepts of nationbuilding and reconciliation, which clearly 
contradict international concepts. The example of Timor 
Leste shows how much this complementary approach still 
requires the acceptance of political stakeholders in order to 
have an impact on reform processes in post-conflict coun-
tries. At the same time it proves even more vulnerable to 
the structural deficits and incapacities typical of a post-
conflict situation, which aggravates the risk of reducing 
transitional justice to an internationally initiated short-
term intervention.
After a short introduction to transitional justice in peace 
operations, I will propose a model of analysis in which the 
use of different concepts of transitional justice is traced 
beyond their application within the respective mechanisms 
up to their impact on the democratic institution-building 
process. In order to set the stage for such an assessment of 
the impact of international approaches to transitional jus-
tice in Timor Leste, I will discuss the origins and evolution 
of narratives on nationhood in Timor Leste. Subsequently, 
the developments within the field of transitional justice in 
East Timor are reconstructed up to and including the dis-
cussion in the East Timorese parliament about a repar-
ations program and an Institute of Public Memory. As I 
will demonstrate, internationally induced transitional jus-
tice initiatives have been successfully sidelined by political 
leaders as incompatible with the East Timorese history of 
resistance, traditions, and world views.
1. Transitional Justice in Peace Operations
In the 1980 and 1990s transitional justice was mainly a 
matter of democratic transitions and exclusively an inter-
nal affair for governments (Teitel 2003, 71). Research fo-
cused on political constellations to analyze elites’ choices 
with regard to dealing with the past (Huntington 1991; 
Huyse 1995). It took the events in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda for transitional justice to become an in-
strument of intervention and peacebuilding. However, re-
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search on the international ad hoc tribunals laid open 
their incapacity to foster reconciliation, recognize victims’ 
suffering, or acknowledge their rights (Mertus 2000; Ak-
havam 1998). Jelena Subotic (2009) demonstrated how 
compliance with international law in Bosnia and Serbia 
served as window-dressing to avert international pressure. 
She concluded that this problem exists first and foremost 
for international tribunals, while a broader approach 
would prevent transitional justice from becoming a 
political instrument in the hand of national leaders (383). 
Since the complementary approach to transitional justice 
developed in response to this critique was implemented 
within the respective country it was expected to have a 
positive impact on statebuilding by demonstrating rule of 
law and by having a capacity-building effect on national 
justice systems (Stromseth 2006, 249ff.). Truth commis-
sions were expected to help foster an inclusive national 
identity and contribute to peacebuilding by facilitating 
reconciliation (Hazan 2006, 21). In this context owner-
ship was introduced as a new norm of conduct for transi-
tional justice processes (Stromseth 2006; Annan 2004). It 
is therefore worthwhile to analyze whether this com-
plementary approach has been able to render transitional 
justice more effective for the UN’s peace- and statebuild-
ing agenda.
2. Norm Diffusion in Peace Operations
Since the early 1990s, norms have become an explanatory 
factor for political change on the domestic and inter-
national level. Thomas Risse, Stephen C. Ropp, and Kath-
ryn Sikkink (1999) introduced a spiral model of norm 
diffusion in which domestic and international human 
rights networks force a repressive regime into tactical con-
cessions followed by the institutionalization of rule-con-
sistent behavior. However, peace operations give a different 
context to the transfer of norms since international actors 
can directly influence the agenda of a post-conflict political 
system and compel domestic actors to institutionalize new 
norms. This situation involves a high risk of creating a con-
flict between officially accepted norms and the personal 
convictions people act upon at the receiving end. Antje 
Wiener (2004) therefore introduced the concept of norm 
contestation focusing on the conflictive interpretations 
 actors ascribe to a norm. In Amitav Acharya’s concept of 
norm localization (2009), domestic actors actively recon-
struct new norms to make them fit their own cognitive 
prior. This cognitive prior comprises shared systems of be-
liefs, practices, and ideas of the nation’s “founding fathers” 
(22–23).
These approaches place the focus on political leaders in 
processes of norm transfer – not only in defining the cog-
nitive prior of a post-conflict society but also discursively 
contesting externally introduced norms. This is even more 
pertinent in a post-conflict context where state structures 
are weak and political actors enjoy even greater power to 
interfere in political processes and influence political devel-
opments in an ad hoc manner. Therefore, to adequately 
evaluate processes of norm transfer not only the function-
ing of political institutions but also political ad hoc prac-
tices have to be taken into account. Thus, I will analyze 
how domestic actors have responded to internationally in-
duced transitional justice mechanisms and how they deal 
with these mechanisms’ outputs, such as the final report of 
a truth commission or indictments of a tribunal, on a prac-
tical and a discursive level. As the article will demonstrate, 
it is up to political leaders to decide if an internationally in-
duced concept of transitional justice will have an impact 
on democratic institution-building, by serving as a role 
model for the justice sector and for how to deal with situ-
ations of crisis for example.
3. Political Elites and Narratives of Nationhood in Timor Leste
In the following I draw on Antje Wiener’s (2009) approach 
to study the “meaning-in-use” of norms to trace discursive 
reactions of political leaders to international transitional 
justice initiatives in Timor Leste. By focusing on speeches 
and interviews with East Timorese leaders and inter-
national actors of the UN peace operations the varying 
meanings which are ascribed to the same norms by dif-
ferent actors shall be illustrated. In addition, a closer look 
at political practices and processes of institutionalization 
will show how actors enact norms while at the same time 
contesting their validity. In this article, the term “political 
elite” refers to actors engaged in high level party politics, be 
it government or opposition. In the case of Timor Leste all 
of these leaders were part of the resistance movement and 
draw their legitimacy from their experiences under occu-
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pation.1 Therefore, the broader population perceives them 
as the “founding fathers” of the nation, providing them 
with great symbolic authority. The first half of this section 
gives an overview of the historic developments in Timor 
Leste that led to the referendum and the different peace op-
erations. The second half will demonstrate how different 
narratives of nationhood and national identity have 
evolved over time.
After more than four hundred years under Portuguese rule 
and a short but brutal civil war, Timor Leste declared its in-
dependence on November 28, 1975. Only nine days later 
Indonesia invaded and forced the leading political move-
ment FRETILIN (Frente Revolucionaria de Timor Leste In-
dependente) to withdraw into the mountains. From there 
FRETILIN organized the resistance struggle against the In-
donesian forces. During the occupation almost two 
hundred thousand people died from sickness and star-
vation due to forced resettlement or counter-insurgency 
operations in which the civilian population was used as 
human shields (CAVR 2005, 6.1). In 1981, Ray Kala “Xan-
ana” Gusmao became the new leader of FRETILIN.2 He 
presented the East Timorese cause as a fight against human 
rights violations and became internationally even more 
well-known when he was captured in 1992 (Niner 2009, 
161). In the wake of the Asian financial crisis of 1998, 
President Suharto’s regime in Indonesia collapsed and 
hopes for independence rose quickly in Timor Leste. A ref-
erendum about independence or autonomy within the In-
donesian nation-state was agreed upon by Portugal, the 
UN and Suharto’s successor Jusuf Habibie. When the re-
sults of the referendum turned out to be in favor of inde-
pendence on September 4, 1999, pro-integration militias 
unleashed a campaign of retaliation, killing almost 1,500 
people (UN GA A/54/660, 8).3 In response the UN de-
ployed the multinational force INTERFRET to restore se-
curity, followed by the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in East Timor (UNTAET). UNTAET was 
tasked with rebuilding the country from scratch, since 
more than 70 percent of its infrastructure had been de-
stroyed. After independence on May 20, 2002, two con-
siderably smaller missions were installed; UNMISET 
(United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor) and 
UNOTIL (United Nations office in Timor Leste). However, 
after a crisis in 2006 a mission with a broader mandate was 
established: UNMIT (United Nations Integrated Mission to 
Timor Leste) was entrusted with security sector reform and 
rule of law development; its mandate ended in December 
2012.
Although FRETILIN presented its cause as the struggle of 
the common people, the civil war of 1974/75 had left a 
divisive legacy for the political parties in East Timor.4 
When Gusmao gained leadership of FRETILIN and its 
armed wing FALINTIL (Forças Armadas da Libertação Na-
cional de Timor-Leste), he stripped the movement of its 
socialist stance and convinced supporters of the former op-
position party UDT (Uniao Democratice Timorense) and 
the church to join the movement (CAVR 2005, 3.15). This 
generated support among East Timorese living in exile, 
many of them UDT supporters (Schmitz 2010, 97). Ac-
cordingly, in 1984, FRETILIN declared “national unity” as 
its political line, which led to frictions between socialist 
hardliners and their leader (CAVR 2005, 3.15). However, 
growing international attention proved Gusmao right: the 
diaspora presented the Timorese cause as a people suffer-
ing from human rights violations, a discourse which had 
greater resonance among the transnational human rights 
movement (Wise 2004). At the same time political leaders 
stressed the close connection between the guerilla forces 
1 Xanana Gusmao became the first president after 
independence. Dr. Mari Alkatiri, Secretary General 
of FRETILIN, was a founding member of FRETILIN 
in 1975 and the first prime minister after indepen-
dence in 2002. José Ramos-Horta was Minister of 
Foreign Affairs in the FRETILIN government in 
1975. He received the Nobel Peace Prize for his 
diplomatic struggle in 1996, together with the 
bishop of Dili, Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo.
2 When Gusmao took over the leadership of 
FRETILIN in 1981, he set up a threefold resistance 
front consisting of a diplomatic, a clandestine, and 
an armed wing. Before this, the resistance movement 
had been practically defeated by the occupying 
forces during the period between 1975 and 1981.
3 The result of the referendum was 78.5 percent 
in favor of independence. Despite the intimidation 
tactics of pro-Indonesian militias, turnout was 98.6 
percent (Myrttinen 2009, 222).
4 FRETILIN used the term Maubere, originally a 
derogative name for the illiterate population used by 
the Portuguese, as a unifying label to represent the 
East Timorese (Traube 2007, 9). However, other par-
ties interpreted this denotation in a highly divisive 
manner, pitting the racially “pure” East Timorese 
against the mixed-blood mestizos population. This 
divided FRETILIN from other parties whose sup-
porters were former colonial administrators (CAVR 
2005, 3.1).
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and the civil population as a suffering but united nation 
(Niner 2000, 153ff.; Ruak 2000). 
This strong notion of a suffering nation gained a different 
meaning in post-independence political discourse. After 
the common enemy had vanished, “national unity” proved 
to be difficult to manage and competition arose over his-
toric ownership of the resistance and the distribution of 
government positions (Babo-Soares 2003, 144). Political 
leaders used their resistance record to demonstrate their 
connection with the population and their readiness for 
political leadership (Silva 2007, 165). This issue of deser-
vedness contains an inherent logic of reciprocity: on the 
one hand, the claim for a position of political leadership 
relies on a person’s role in the resistance (Silva 2007, 168; 
Hohe 2002, 78). On the other hand, various groups in so-
ciety demand material compensation from their leaders 
based on their support for these individuals and on their 
own contribution to the resistance (Roll 2011, 74; ICG 
2011, 4).5
Hence, the question who did what during the resistance 
period gained centrality within the political discourse and 
became the defining feature for national identity, displac-
ing the “national unity” narrative. This is illustrated by the 
wording of the constitution of 2002, which lists “val-
orization of the resistance” as one of the republic’s funda-
mental principles. The constitution also commits the state 
to “special protection of all those who dedicated their lives 
to the struggle for independence and national sovereignty” 
(RDTL 2002, 11.3).
4. Transitional Justice in Timor Leste
At the time of the establishment of UNTAET, the United 
Nations had already developed its complementary ap-
proach to transitional justice. In 1997, the Office of the 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) had af-
firmed victims’ rights to truth and reparations in addition 
to a “duty to prosecute” (UN Commission of Human 
Rights 1997). Truth commissions supplemented the pros-
ecutorial approach, albeit the “duty to prosecute” was still 
given priority (Trenkov-Wermuth 2010, 28; Bassiouni 
2006, 9). On the question of reconciliation, the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council discussed the ap-
plication of mechanisms of restorative justice in 1999; the 
final recommendation was to apply such initiatives only to 
minor offenders (UN Economic and Social Council 1999).
When UNTAET was established in October 1999, the UN 
sent a team of special rapporteurs on human rights viol-
ations to prepare recommendations on how to deal with 
East Timor’s violent past. The special rapporteurs stressed 
that the East Timorese would “continue to seek justice and 
are unable to come to terms with their sorrow and distress” 
(UN General Assembly 1999, 12). In other words, they 
presented themselves as the legitimate spokespersons of the 
East Timorese suggesting that ignoring this concern would 
endanger the newly won peace and stability. An inter-
national tribunal for the human rights violations com-
mitted before and after the referendum in 1999 was 
proposed but support quickly faded in the light of the great 
expense of the international tribunals for Rwanda and the 
former Yugoslavia. Instead, the option of two ad hoc tribu-
nals established in Indonesia and Timor Leste was pre-
ferred by the Security Council.
4.1. International and East Timorese Approaches to “Serious Crimes”
In June 2000, UNTAET established a Special Panel within 
the Dili District Court to prosecute genocide, war crimes, 
and crimes against humanity (UNTAET 2000). In addition, 
“Serious Crimes” – defined as murder, sexual offenses, and 
torture, committed between January 1 and October 25, 
1999 – were also to be prosecuted. These offences were 
added to the offences defined by jus cogens especially to 
deal with the violence before and after the referendum. 
UNTAET thereby stressed the importance of prosecutions 
as a basis for establishing a credible criminal justice system 
and as a precondition for reconciliation (Larke 2009, 655).6 
5 In the post-referendum period various veterans’ 
groups were formed based on these claims. Groups 
such as Sacrada Familia and CPD-RDTL (Resistance 
Council of the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste) 
recruit members among former guerillas who are 
discontent with the demobilization program and the 
lack of material support from their leaders (ICG 
2006, 2011; Babo-Soares 2003, 175).
6 This stance was also mentioned in interviews 
with members of UNMIT’s Serious Crimes Investi-
gation Team and its Human Rights and Transitional 
Justice Unit.
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The Special Panel was intended to consist of international 
and national judges along with a Serious Crimes Unit 
(SCU) for investigations. At that time, there were no prac-
ticing judges in East Timor, so UNTAET had to train do-
mestic personnel on the job.7 A Defense Lawyers Unit was 
only established in 2002, two years after the creation of the 
Special Panel. From the very beginning the Special Panel 
had to deal with serious budget cuts. Due to lack of fund-
ing and personnel, it was forced to focus exclusively on the 
violence of 1999, to the detriment of the wider context of 
the Indonesian occupation.8 The achievements of the Panel 
remained modest: it concluded fifty-five trials with eighty-
five convictions, all of them low-ranking members of East 
Timorese militias. Significantly, despite a Memorandum of 
Understanding with UNTAET, no high-ranking Indonesian 
military officers were tried, since Indonesia refused to hand 
over indicted persons.
In addition, East Timor’s political leadership presented 
their approach to the question of accountability for human 
rights violations which clearly contradicted the UN’s ap-
proach. Even before independence, Ray Kala Xanana Gus-
mao stressed the importance of reconciliation through 
forgiveness.9 Hence, instead of prosecutions, the repat-
riation of the more than 250,000 East Timorese who had 
been forcibly resettled in West Timor was declared the 
national priority. From 2000 on, Gusmao and José Ramos-
Horta initiated meetings on the border with West Timor to 
encourage people to return. For these so-called border rec-
onciliation meetings they allowed indicted militia leaders 
to safely cross the border in spite of the indictments the 
SCU prosecutors had issued against some of these individ-
uals (Kyodo News Service 2001). The return and reinte-
gration of high-ranking militia members was justified as a 
necessary means to restore “national unity” as a precon-
dition for development (Ramos-Horta 1999; Gusmao 
1999). In this context, reconciliation was presented as an 
act of clemency and personal strength on behalf of the vic-
tims (Gusmao 2003a). According to such a “reconciliation 
through forgiveness” narrative, the pursuit of justice was 
revenge without moral legitimacy (Gusamo 2003c). In ad-
dition, Gusmao claimed that prosecutorial justice was not 
necessary for a deterrent effect (Lusa 2000). Instead he ar-
gued that the people of Timor Leste would only require 
members of the militias to apologize in order to forgive 
them. Political leaders also condemned the UN’s “Serious 
Crimes” process as selective, trying East Timorese only. It 
was criticized for its “excessive” verdicts and for diverting 
much-needed funds from Timor Leste’s development 
agenda while poverty prevailed for the people (Gusmao 
2003b; Lusa 2003). In this context, development and inde-
pendence were presented as “real justice” for the people, to 
which the prosecutorial approach of the “Serious Crimes” 
process posed a severe challenge (Lusa 2003; Gusmao 
2003a; Sherif 2009).
Given the lack of any credible court structure in East 
Timor, UNTAET started to consider mechanisms of tradi-
tional conflict settlement to deal with minor crimes com-
mitted since April 1974. In 2000, UNTAET’s Human Rights 
Section introduced the idea of a truth commission for 
Timor Leste. All East Timorese political stakeholders, back 
then still integrated in the CNRT (Conselho Nacional da 
Resistência Timorense), supported this initiative, em-
phasizing the need for a “commission of resettlement and 
reconciliation” (CNS 2000). Xanana Gusmao also per-
sistently referred to the model of the South African truth 
and reconciliation commission to stress the idea of am-
nesty for high-ranking perpetrators, depicting the search 
for truth as counterproductive for the development of the 
nation in various statements (Dodd 2000; Gusmao 2003c; 
ABC 2001).
Consultations held by UNTAET on how to facilitate recon-
ciliation concluded that a traditional mechanism for con-
flict resolution should be applied to minor offences while 
perpetrators of “Serious Crimes” were to be referred to the 
prosecutor general (CAVR 2005, 9.1). This stance fitted the 
7 After all the East Timorese trained judges, de-
fenders, and prosecutors failed their exams in 2004, 
internationals had to take over again until 2007 
(Braithwaite, Charlesworth, and Soares 2012, 176).
8 Interview with members of the Serious Crimes 
Investigation Team of UNMIT in Dili, March and 
April 2011
9 In June 1999, Gusmao offered an amnesty for 
militia leaders who renounced violence (Cristalis 
2002, 211).
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UN’s approach to reconciliation and restorative justice but 
contradicted Gusmao’s concept of reconciliation as for-
giveness on all levels. On July 13, 2001, UNTAET estab-
lished the Commission for Reception, Truth, and 
Reconciliation (Comissao de Acolhimento, Verdade e Rec-
onciliacao, CAVR), including a Community Reconciliation 
Program (CRP) based on the traditional practice of nahe 
biti (to spread the mat). For this mechanism of conflict res-
olution the victim and the alleged perpetrator were to meet 
on a mat in front of the community to settle conflicts with 
the mediation of local leaders and a regional commissioner 
of the CAVR (CAVR 2005, 9.2). Perpetrators were re-
quested to ask for forgiveness and to compensate the vic-
tims and their communities. According to observers, the 
proceedings focused strongly on the rehabilitation of the 
perpetrators instead of providing a platform to recognize 
people’s suffering. In the absence of high-ranking militia 
members, perpetrators were able to present themselves as 
minor offenders who had been forced to join the militias, 
leaving aside the wider context of the human rights viol-
ations (Larke 2009, 661; Kent 2004, 15–16).10 Since 
people’s willingness to reintegrate minor offenders relied 
on the expectation that major offenders would be tried in 
the “Serious Crimes” process, the CRP made the work of 
the latter even more important. However, due to the im-
mense backlog in the “Serious Crimes” process, hardly any 
of the cases referred to the prosecutor general have yet been 
tried (Braithwaite 2012, 212).
The truth-seeking component of the CAVR staged public 
hearings in all districts and collected accounts from more 
than 7,800 people. It published its final report in 2005, cal-
ling for the prosecution of high-ranking Indonesian gen-
erals.11 The report also issued more than two hundred 
recommendations for reform of Timor Leste’s political and 
security institutions (CAVR 2005, 11) paying special at-
tention to victims’ rights to truth, including the state’s ob-
ligation to search for involuntarily disappeared people as 
well as victims’ right to compensation. However, at the re-
port’s official handover to the president on October 31, 
2005, then President Gusmao decidedly dismissed the re-
port’s stance on victimhood :
In general, I must stress that the responsibilities that befell upon 
us, the sons and daughters of a people whose mission was to 
guide that people in its march towards liberation, was a tacit 
acceptance of our own duties. . . . In times of sacrifice we rose to 
be heroes. Today, in times of peace, we are regarded as victims! 
Our people, the heroic and forsaken people of Timor Leste, do 
not deserve to be treated with so blatant a disrespect! (Gusmao 
2005)
Gusmao, as well as then Prime Minister Mari Alkatiri, 
stressed the moral indefeasibility of the resistance move-
ment and dismissed the commission’s mandate to establish 
a comprehensive truth.12
This brief look at transitional justice mechanisms in East 
Timor highlights that their application was highly con-
tested by domestic political leaders. To legitimize their 
agendas, both sides, international actors as well as East 
Timorese political leaders, constructed a cognitive prior 
claiming to represent the wishes and concerns of the East 
Timorese people. The special rapporteurs presented East 
Timorese voices in order to demand an ad hoc tribunal for 
human rights violations, and consultations on how to es-
tablish a reconciliation mechanism were used by UNTAET 
to legitimize its approach of prosecutorial justice and rec-
onciliation. On the contrary, Xanana Gusmao claimed that 
the people would forgive former militia members if only 
they received an apology. At the same time he presented a 
reconciliation commission’s main task as setting the stage 
for granting amnesties.
Since none of the national leaders had explicitly called for a 
mechanism of truth-finding (but only for reconciliation), 
the final report as the CAVR’s main output did not meet 
their interests and was highly contested by East Timorese 
10 Although the CRP had a mandate to facilitate 
reconciliation relating to acts committed between 
April 25, 1974, and October 25, 1999, more than 90 
percent of the cases dealt with were committed in 
1999 (Interview with Ben Larke, former advisor to 
CAVR Dili, May 15, 2011).
11 FRETILIN and its armed wing FALINTIL were 
declared responsible for 10 percent of the human 
rights violations of which most were committed 
during the civil war in 1975 (CAVR 2005, 8.1).
12 Alkatiri admitted FRETILIN’s excesses during 
the war but rejected the claimed death toll. His big-
gest concern was that the publication of the report 
would lead to social unrest and persecutions of al-
leged perpetrators (Lusa 2005).
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political leaders. Notions on victimhood contradicted the 
official narrative of a “valorization of resistance.” In terms 
of political practices, José Ramos-Horta and Xanana Gus-
mao proved successful in their initiatives to convince refu-
gees and militias in West Timor to return. Their move 
clearly challenged the UN’s initiative for prosecutorial jus-
tice through the “Serious Crimes” process.
The prosecutorial approach of the United Nations also suf-
fered from the structural deficits of a post-conflict situ-
ation. There was a delay in setting up the Special Panel 
because the country’s entire infrastructure had to be re-
built. For instance, the majority of the well-educated work-
force had left the country, so local staff had to be trained 
first. The whole endeavor was seriously constrained by se-
vere cuts in Special Panel’s budget. Therefore, while inter-
national actors were committed to present their agenda as a 
representation of the East Timorese peoples’ interest and to 
create ownership on behalf of the East Timorese, the 
budget cuts clearly demonstrated a lack of ownership re-
garding the United Nations’ concern about the “Serious 
Crimes” process.
After the preceding sub-section has discussed the establish-
ment of mechanisms of transitional justice and the outputs 
they have produced in Timor Leste, the following part 
presents government initiatives and political practices, 
which reflect transitional justice mechanisms as well as 
cases where an institutionalization of the mechanisms’ out-
put has been averted.
4.2. The Impact of Transitional Justice Mechanisms on the Domestic Level
Although the outbreak of the crisis in 2006 cannot be ex-
plained with reference to controversies about the nation’s 
past only, it still demonstrated the risk of violent outbreaks 
around these issues. In January, 159 members of the 
F-FDTL defense forces (FALINTIL-Forcas Defensas Timor 
Leste) signed a petition complaining about recruitment, 
promotion, and disciplinary measures. The soldiers 
claimed to be discriminated against based on the allegation 
that people from the Western part of Timor Leste had 
formerly collaborated with the occupation forces while 
people from the East had fought for independence (ICG 
2006, 6). In March 2006 the group, which had grown to 
nearly six hundred soldiers, was dismissed from the armed 
forces. The protest of these so-called “petitioners” became 
a catalyst for all sorts of dissenting groups expressing frus-
tration over employment opportunities, living conditions, 
and government benefits and turned into a major conflict 
between the Western-dominated police and the Eastern-
dominated defense forces. The conflict brought long-
standing grievances between different political figures to 
the surface, some of them dating back to the 1980s when 
Gusmao opened up the resistance movement to other 
political factions (ICG 2006, 4). The crisis left thirty-eight 
dead, hundreds of houses burnt, and more than one 
hundred thousand internally displaced. Prime Minister 
Mari Alkatiri was forced to step down and was replaced by 
José Ramos-Horta until elections were held in 2007. Since 
the crisis demonstrated the discontent of various groups in 
independent Timor Leste, the government enhanced its 
benefit scheme in order to meet grievances concerning 
housing and medical care.13 This move was crafted accord-
ing to the “valorization of resistance” narrative and in 2007 
Gusmao as newly elected prime minister made the pay-
ment of veterans’ pensions the priority of his government. 
Contrary to the notion that everybody had somehow con-
tributed to the resistance movement (see Ruak 2000), the 
respective law, enacted in 2006, pronounced an exclusive 
definition of who qualifies as a “veteran” and who is there-
fore eligible to pensions: only persons with more than eight 
years of full-time service in the resistance movement’s 
armed wing and family members of those who had fought 
for more than fifteen years were eligible for pensions 
(RDTL 2006). After vociferous protests from members of 
the clandestine front,14 a one-off payment was introduced 
for people who had served the resistance outside its armed 
wing (ICG 2011, 7; RDTL 2009). The limitation of deser-
13 The connection between the crisis and the broa-
dening of the benefit schemes was referred to in in-
terviews with representatives from UNMIT Depart-
ment of Political Affairs as well as representatives 
from various NGOs working on good governance 
and security sector reform in East Timor.
14 The clandestine front comprised persons who 
secretly supported the resistance movement while 
officially collaborating with the occupation forces. 
Given the secrecy of their missions it is difficult for 
members to prove their service.
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vedness to an exclusive group of veterans can also be ob-
served on a symbolic level, with medals handed out in 
“recognition ceremonies” (World Bank 2008, 21) and the 
establishment of so-called heroes’ cemeteries, where ex-
clusively veterans are buried.
The crisis of 2006 constituted a serious test for rule of law 
development in Timor Leste. A Commission of Inquiry set 
up by the UN proposed the prosecution of several individ-
uals for crimes against humanity (UN 2006). Some of 
these alleged perpetrators were tried but the way the gov-
ernment dealt with the crisis reflected the narrative of 
“reconciliation through forgiveness” rather than the pros-
ecutorial approach of the UN. In May 2008, President 
Ramos-Horta pardoned ninety-four individuals, among 
them seven former militia fighters involved in the violence 
in 1999, and in August 2010 he reduced the sentences of 
twenty-six persons convicted of involvement in the crisis 
in 2006 (Interpress Service 2008).15 He presented this 
move as part of his reconciliation policy to leave behind 
the violent past (Presidential decree no. 31/2010, see CIGI 
2011, 3). In December 2006, a reconciliation ceremony was 
held in Dili to officially end the crisis. Leaders from all par-
ties sat together on a huge mat, officially admitted their 
mistakes and hugged each other (Braithwaite, Charles-
worth, and Soares 2012, 326). Reconciliation meetings 
were also organized for the defense forces and the police as 
well as for refugees on their return to their communities 
(ibid.). This approach to reconciliation has also been in-
stitutionalized through the Department of Peacebuilding 
and Social Cohesion, whose task is to establish “peace-
building mechanisms and procedures in the national gov-
ernment” and to “strengthen conflict-resolution capacity 
and mechanisms at the community level” (Muggah and 
LeBrun 2010, 33).
Drawing from this example, the traditional practices which 
formed the basis for the Community Reconciliation Pro-
gram were used officially to deal with a situation of crisis: 
political leaders institutionalized the concept to be ap-
plicable on the political level. In addition, the practice of 
pardons and reduction of sentences has rendered the impact 
of the “Serious Crimes” process concerning the demon-
stration of a functioning rule of law system practically nil.
4.3. Dealing with Victims’ Rights on the National and Bilateral Level
In 2001, Indonesia agreed to set up an ad hoc tribunal in 
Jakarta to deal with the crimes of 1999. However, the pro-
ceedings turned into farce when of the eighteen accused 
only six were convicted and given very short sentences 
(UNSC 2005, 41ff.). In May 2005, a UN Commission of 
Experts reviewed the work of the Special Panel and the ad 
hoc tribunal in Jakarta and recommended setting up an in-
ternational tribunal because the proceedings had been 
politically interfered with in both countries (62). The plan 
of the East Timorese and the Indonesian government to set 
up a bilateral truth commission must therefore be under-
stood as an initiative to sideline further demands for inves-
tigations and prosecutions, as many observers have argued 
(JSMP 2005; Asia Pacific Solidarity Net 2007).16
The aim of the Commission of Truth and Friendship 
(CTF), installed in May 2005, was to establish the truth 
about human rights violations before and after the referen-
dum in 1999 and prepare recommendations to “heal the 
wounds of the past and to strengthen friendship” between 
the two nations (CTF 2008, i). Accordingly, the commission 
was given a mandate to grant amnesties. Although the com-
mission was criticized as an attempt to put an end to 
further investigations, the commission’s output was surpris-
ingly blunt: it found the Indonesian military responsible for 
the human rights violations, and did not recommend am-
nesties, because none of the alleged perpetrators had fulfil-
led the criteria of full cooperation with the commission 
(CTF 2008: 296). While the Indonesian government had re-
jected the findings of the CAVR, it was now compelled to 
accept the findings of the CTF and therefore to officially ac-
knowledge responsibility, albeit on an institutional instead 
of an individual level (Antara News 2006).
Given its bilateral nature, the CTF can be seen as an in-
stitutionalized contestation of the prosecutorial approach 
15 Of the nine high-ranking persons convicted for 
their role in the 2006 crisis, seven were pardoned or 
got their sentence reduced which led to their im-
mediate release in 2011 (CIGI 2011, 14).
16 Interview with Edward Rees, Peace Dividend 
Trust, Dili, March 10, 2011
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of the United Nations.17 The commission’s mandate fitted 
the “reconciliation through forgiveness” narrative since it 
was assigned to grant amnesties to the highest level of per-
petrators. At the same time it paid tribute to the “val-
orization of resistance” narrative as the basis for Timor 
Leste’s national identity because the mandate covered the 
events of 1999 only and therefore did not investigate resis-
tance members’ responsibilities for human rights viol-
ations. However, the output of the commission, its final 
report, presented a strong stance for victims’ right to truth 
about the events in 1999 and therefore served the goals of 
the international actors’ agenda better than expected.18
To return to the output of the CAVR, its final report was 
handed over to the UN Security Council on January 23, 
2006. However, President Gusmao refrained from pub-
lication within Timor Leste, pointing to other priorities for 
the country’s development and suggesting that its content 
was too sensitive for publication (Gusmao 2006). To this 
day, the report has not been discussed in the East Timorese 
parliament but international and local NGOs used the re-
port’s recommendations as a starting point to promote the 
establishment of an “Institute of Public Memory” (In-
stituto Público da Memória) entrusted with the super-
vision of the implementation of the CAVR’s 
recommendations (RDTL 2010). The Human Rights and 
Transitional Justice Section of UNMIT also started to lobby 
for such an institute in order to create “at least some sense 
of justice for the victims.”19 A “National Consensus Dia-
logue” conducted from 2008 to 2010 brought these issues 
back into the political arena. Thereby, in 2009, political 
leaders agreed upon the development of the respective 
draft laws for a reparations program and an “Institute of 
Public Memory”, on the condition that none of the ini-
tiatives would result in the prosecution of veterans.20
The draft law on reparations comprises mechanisms of 
symbolic and collective reparations with a clear emphasis 
on infrastructure, education, and psychosocial counseling 
as a contribution to development and inclusive nation-
building. Its definition of who qualifies as a victim is inde-
pendent of a person’s political affiliation and therefore also 
grants victims of human rights violations committed by 
members of the resistance the right to reparations. This 
issue poses a serious problem since in the eyes of many 
East Timorese, supporters of the integration with Indone-
sia do not deserve to be compensated for any harm done to 
them.21 Several attempts to stage a discussion of the two 
draft laws in parliament have been postponed.22 In Feb-
ruary 2011, a coalition of parliamentarians requested that 
75 percent of the veterans should be registered for the pen-
sions program before a law about reparations for the vic-
tims could be passed in parliament.23 As the following 
statement by one FRETILIN member of parliament shows, 
this notion reflects the logic of deservedness:
There are those who fought and those who didn’t fight but sup-
ported the resistance and then there are those who did not sup-
port the resistance. First, we have to take care of those who 
fought, then we can care about those who didn’t fight, and 
when they are doing well we can take care of the others.24
The draft law about the “Institute of Public Memory” re-
iterates these tensions. The institute would have the man-
date to search for involuntarily disappeared persons, collect 
information about human rights violations within the 
period from 1974 to 1999, and engage in public education 
about this period. This poses a threat to the independence 
movement nostalgia on which the “valorization of the re-
sistance” narrative is based. Consequently, especially the 
period of examination which includes the civil war in 1975 
was criticized.25 Parliamentarians also argued that the in-
stitute would divert much-needed funds from other pro-
17 In several interviews in the East Timorese 
Foreign Ministry, the bilateral nature of the CTF was 
presented as a ground-breaking development in in-
ternational politics and as a more effective means 
than any prosecutorial mechanism (interviews in 
Dili, May 2011).
18 Interview with Louis Gentile, Head of the 
Human Rights and Transitional Justice Section of 
UNMIT, Dili, March 6, 2011
19 Interview with Louis Gentile, see note 19.
20 Interview with an advisor to the national parlia-
ment, Dili, April 19, 2011.
21 Parliamentarians, NGO representatives, and 
members of UNMIT identified the draft law’s victim 
definition as the most sensitive issue. None of the 
victims of the occupation I was able to talk to ac-
cepted that former supporters of the integration 
with Indonesia should be granted reparations.
22 A discussion was staged for September 2010, 
February 2011, October 2011, and April 2012.
23 This alliance mainly comprises parliamentarians 
who are closely connected with veterans’ associations 
but also includes members of all major parties.
24 Interview with David Dias Ximenes, MP, Dili, 
April 16, 2011.
25 Interview with David Dias Ximenes and other 
MPs who prefer not to be identified.
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jects which are better suited to support the nation’s 
development. However, in comparison to the veterans’ 
pensions program the institute has a comparatively small 
budget.26
As these developments show, domestic political actors have 
been able to sideline the norms institutionalized within 
transitional justice mechanisms when it comes to their 
adoption on the domestic political level. Despite efforts to 
fit the reparations law into the government’s nation build-
ing and development agenda, the draft laws have not been 
passed by the parliament. Especially the reparations law’s 
inclusive definition of victims contradicts the “valorization 
of resistance” and the inherent concept of deservedness. 
The same problem can be observed for the “Institute of 
Public Memory”. Its initiative to seek information about 
the deeds of the resistance movement creates a fundamen-
tal threat to the common resistance nostalgia.
5. Conclusion: What Is Left of Transitional Justice in Timor Leste?
As has been demonstrated in this article, the impact of 
transitional justice initiatives on the long-term goals of 
peace operations crucially depends on political leaders’ 
willingness to adopt international concepts of transitional 
justice on the domestic level. Therefore, the UN’s func-
tionalistic approach of transitional justice as having an im-
pact on the rule of law and the formation of an inclusive 
national identity has not proven to be effective. Instead, 
political leaders in Timor Leste have successfully promoted 
their own exclusive version of nationbuilding, which is 
based on a narrative about a morally indefeasible resis-
tance. Additionally, the aim to demonstrate the functioning 
of rule of law through prosecutions has been adapted by 
domestic leaders to include acts of clemency and forgive-
ness in order to leave behind the violent past. The CAVR’s 
final report was prevented from having an impact on in-
clusive nationbuilding since its recommendations concern-
ing victims’ rights have not been implemented. Since the 
parliament has refused to discuss its contents, the report 
has been sidelined in the political discourse and the nar-
rative to “valorize the resistance” has been disseminated on 
symbolic and material levels instead. While narratives of 
“national unity” could have precluded an exclusive defini-
tion of national identity, post-referendum political dy-
namics have led to the structuring of the political discourse 
and the government’s willingness to provide welfare ac-
cording to issues of deservedness .
Therefore, Subotic’s expectation (2009), that a com-
plementary approach to transitional justice would avert 
window-dressing activities of political leaders cannot be 
confirmed. The example of Timor Leste demonstrates that 
a post-conflict situation is not only an arena for inter-
national actors to transfer their norms but much more for 
domestic leaders to promote their interests and norms. 
Transitional justice, regardless whether applied inside or 
outside the country, still needs the willingness and owner-
ship of domestic political actors if it is to be taken beyond 
an adoption in mechanisms of transitional justice and have 
an impact on political institution-building. This is es-
pecially the case in a post-conflict situation where state 
structures are weak and political leaders enjoy authority 
due to their personal history. While international actors 
were focusing on creating ownership for their transitional 
justice initiatives they were not aware that there already 
existed ownership on the part of the political leadership for 
a different understanding of justice and reconciliation. The 
fact that the complementary approach to transitional jus-
tice is based within the respective country enhances the 
possibilities for domestic actors to interfere in the justice 
process and to render an internationally designed agenda 
meaningless. At the same time weak post-conflict infra-
structure makes even more ownership on the part of inter-
national actors necessary, which was not granted in the 
case of Timor Leste. For Timor Leste this means that an in-
stitutionalization of norms of transitional justice concern-
ing victims’ rights on the domestic level will require a new 
generation of leaders who are willing to overcome the nar-
row definition of national identity based on the “val-
orization of resistance.”
26 Interview with Vicente Guterres, Vice-President 
of the Parliament, May 4, 2011. The planned budget 
of the public memory institute was $1.5 million per 
year. The veterans’ pensions, however, comprised 8 
percent of the 2011 state budget, or $68 million.
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